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IF I IMPLORE YOU AND ORDER YOU TO SET ME FREE 
ROBERT BLECKER* 
Determined to resume his mission to secure the homeland, 
Odysseus took leave of the beautiful goddess Circe who loved him 
passionately. She warned him: deadly perils lie between you and 
your homecoming. Deadliest of all were the Sirens, with their 
sweet, alluring, but fatal song. You could never reach the Sirens. 
The bones of those who had tried littered the rocks around them. 
Before resuming their journey, Odysseus called his men to-
gether. "I do not think it right that only one or two should know, so 
I will tell you all, and when we all know, we may die or escape"1 with 
our eyes open. Odysseus, the Sovereign, told them everything -
well, almost everything. He omitted one small detail: in the end, 
only he would make it back alive. 
As they approached the Sirens, Odysseus commanded his men 
- he was the unquestioned sovereign - his word, absolutely bind-
ing law. Put wax in your ears, but not in mine. Bind me to the 
mast, and row like hell. Whatever I might say under the influence 
of the Sirens, ignore it, and keep rowing. And "if I implore you, and 
order you to set me free, you must tie me tighter. "2 
As predicted, the Sirens' call was overwhelming, and Odysseus 
strained at his ropes, begging his men to unplug their ears, untie 
him, and give in to the moment's temptation. I know what I told 
you before, but ignore it and do what I tell you now.3 
He was bound, but they were in a bind; Odysseus' command 
was law. And now he was ordering them to unplug their ears, and 
untie him. Only by feeling bound by the earlier command, however, 
could they free themselves from fatal, collective self-destruction. 
* Professor of Constitutional History and Criminal Law, New York Law School. 
J.D. Harvard Law School, 1974; B.A. Tufts University, 1969; Harvard Fellow in Law and 
Humanities, 1976-1977. 
l. HOMER, THE OovssEY 141 (W.H.D. Rouse trans., 1937). 
2. Id. (emphasis added). 
3. See id. at 141-42 ("So they sang in lovely tones. From the bottom of my heart I 
longed to listen, and I ordered the men to set me free, nodding my head and working 
my brows; but they simply went on pulling with a good swing."). 
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When the future became the present and the past still controlled, 
there, then, in that moment, constitutionalism was born. 
Constitutionalism itself arises from the sacrifice of the ad hoc 
for the rule bound. Constitutionalism at its core essentially re-
quires self-restraint. We who would enjoy the lasting benefits of a 
constitution must recognize at a rational moment that in the fu-
ture, temptations will lead to actions which, if not fatal, we will live 
later to deeply regret. The great pragmatic constitutional challenge 
haunts us constantly: how can the sovereign effectively limit its own 
power consistent with a continuing command adequate to the peril-
ous journey? 
Time and space prohibit extended discussion here,4 but let me 
suggest briefly some instances of Odysseus at the Mast: first as a 
snapshot of our basic constitutional structure; next as a metaphor 
for the dynamic tension between continuity and change in our sys-
tem of government; and finally as a problem, if not a paradox, for 
today's world, struggling to stay the course of freedom and human 
dignity. 
I. THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
In the United States, as in any real republic, Sovereign Power 
ultimately resides in the body of the People. But at a calm and 
rational moment, the People realize that they will be apt to get car-
ried away at just those times when they can least afford - and will 
later most regret - it. So the People entrust power to their repre-
sentatives, thereby placing it beyond their own control to dictate to 
4. As students in my Constitutional History course will attest, I have been devel-
oping and teaching this metaphor in depth since 1978, each semester devoting a whole 
class to it. I originally prepared and delivered these comments in ignorance of, and 
independent of, a growing literature. Research, however, now reveals that others have 
subsequently developed this metaphor, often in substantially similar ways. Time pres-
sure prohibits exhaustive search and quotation, but interested readers should consult 
the work principally of: joN ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALl"IY 
AND IRRATIONALl"IY 93-96 (1979); and his later book ULYSSES UNBOUND (2000), which 
includes a bibliography. Recent essays employing the metaphor and overlapping much 
of this talk are: Samuel Issacharoff, The Enabling &le of Democratic Constitutionalism: Fixed 
Rules and Some Implications for Contested Presidential Elections, 81 TEx. L. REv. 1985 (2003); 
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REv. 605 
(2003); and Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens' Song of 
the Sroenteenth Amendment, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 500 (1997). 
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those representatives, and then divide that power in an Odysseus-
like move between the legislative, judicial, and executive branches. 
A. The Legislative Branch 
"The Senate," Madison declared in the 63rd Federalist, "may 
be sometimes necessary as a defense to the people against their own tem-
porary errors and delusions. As the cool and deliberate sense of the 
community ought, in all governments, and actually will, in all free 
governments, ultimately prevail ... so there are particular moments 
. . . when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion . . . may call for 
measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament 
and condemn."5 
The Constitution - the creature of the people - must con-
tain, in Madison's words "a safeguard against the tyranny of their own 
passions."6 How did we accomplish this? Most obviously by provid-
ing six-year terms for each elected Senator. These long terms were 
originally designed to insulate U.S. Senators from the state legisla-
tures that selected them, and now from the very People each repre-
sents. Buttressing this insulation, the founding generation 
consciously rejected immediate past practice and placed it outside 
the electors' power to instruct their Senators to vote a certain way. 
Although the state legislatures which selected them might passion-
ately desire a particular vote on a particular issue, Senators retain 
the power and acquire a responsibility to resist that pressure and 
instead to keep an eye on the long-term best interests of the People. 
The Founders also placed it outside the power of the People to re-
call the Senator from office, however furious they may be at this 
moment. Absent impeachment for a crime, the six-year term was 
simply fixed. 
The Founders also decided to reject term limits, or "forced ro-
tation" for members of Congress. On the one hand, periodically 
forcing out representatives would seem to return power closer to 
the People by ensuring fresh blood circulating in Congress, retard-
ing an insular and aristocratic self-perpetuating ruling class, and 
forcing members to return to their lives as private citizens under 
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 384 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(emphasis added). 
6. Id. 
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the influence of the laws they had enacted. On the other hand, 
imposing term limits, as the more populist anti-federalists originally 
- but unsuccessfully - advocated and the amended Constitution 
now provides with the Executive, is an Odysseus-like move, placing 
it outside the power of the People to send whom they wish for as 
long as they wish to represent them. 7 To a lesser extent, the Foun-
ders also showed self-restraint in the House of Representatives with 
its shorter two-year term and, like the Senate, not subject to instruc-
tion or recall. 
B. The judicial Branch 
By giving all federal court judges life tenure, the Founders con-
sciously insulated them from the public passions of the moment. 
Although seemingly out of touch with popular "wisdom," the past 
reaches out to restrain the people. 
Ultimately, however, not only do the People restrain them-
selves through the Court, but the Court too, must restrain itself. It 
must not "make law" by substituting its own views of good policy for 
those of the People's representatives. It must not strike down legis-
lation as "unconstitutional" that seems stupid, offensive, or ineffec-
tive. In short, the Court must restrain its own passion. 
In 1972, for example, a bare majority of Justices in Funnan v. 
Georgi,d3 outlawed the death penalty as applied across the United 
States by characterizing it as "cruel and unusual" and thus violative 
of the Eighth Amendment. Justice Blackmun, dissenting, revealed 
"an excruciating agony of the spirit," reiterating his own deep per-
sonal "distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death 
penalty."9 And although "personally ... rejoic[ing] at the Court's 
result,"10 conceding that as a legislator he would vote against the 
death penalty, and as a governor he would exercise executive clem-
ency, the Justice voted to leave it to the states to decide for them-
selves. Restraining his own passion, he refused to invoke the Eighth 
Amendment: "We should not allow our personal preferences as to 
the wisdom of legislative and congressicnal action, or our distaste 
7. Cf Bybee, supra note 4, at 530-35. 
8. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
9. Id. at 405. 
10. Id. at 414. 
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for such action, to guide our judicial decision . . . . The temptations 
to cross that policy line are very great. In fact, as today's decision 
reveals, they are almost irresistible."11 
Justice Powell also dissented: 
It is not easy to stand aloof and allow want of wisdom to prevail, 
to disregard ones own strongly held view of what is wise in the 
conduct of affairs. But it is not the business of this Court to 
pronounce policy. It must observe a fastidious regard for limita-
tions on its own power, and this precludes the Court's giving 
effect to its own notions of what is wise or politic. That 
self-restraint is of the essence . . . of the judicial oath. 12 
Thus, by giving the court lifetime tenure, the People at a ra-
tional moment placed it out of their own power to act on their an-
ger and remove the judges from office. And only by giving federal 
judges lifetime tenure could We provide for its effective correlative: 
judicial review. We, the People, empower you, the judges, to nullify 
the expressed will even of our own representatives when you hon-
estly discern that this momentary passion contradicts past, deeply-
held, contrary assurances. 
Perhaps Chief Justice Rehnquist in Furman summed it up best 
for the four dissenters who wrestled with 'judicial review in a demo-
cratic society": "How can government ... by the federal judiciary, 
whose members are constitutionally insulated from responsiveness 
to the popular will, declare invalid laws duly enacted by the popular 
branches of government?"13 While unconstitutional exercise of 
power by the executive and legislative branches of the government 
is subject to judicial restraint, "the only check upon our own exercise of 
power is our own sense of self-restraint .... Judicial self-restraint is 
surely an implied, if not an expressed, condition of the grant of 
authority of judicial review."14 
In sum, the People restrained themselves, first by electing rep-
resentatives, then empowering a life-tenured judiciary to check 
those representatives, and also to check themselves. 
11. Furman, 408 U.S. at 411. 
12. Id. at 433 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 119-20 (1958)) (emphasis 
added). 
13. Furman, 408 U.S. at 466. 
14. Id. at 467, 470 (emphasis added). 
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C. The Executive Branch 
The Founders also empowered the Executive to restrain the 
Legislature by veto. The President, a single individual, trumps the 
representatives of a majority - even an overwhelming majority -
and will be sustained by a small minority - 1/3 + 1 - of either 
house. In the selection of the President, the Founders, while gener-
ally adhering to popular sovereignty, nevertheless utilized an electo-
ral college in an Odysseus-like decision again to insulate the 
selection from the popular will. 
And, subsequently, we have also limited the Executive to two 
terms. Suppose we desperately need and overwhelmingly want our 
beloved Commander-in-Chief to continue as President during a 
time of crisis? Too bad. We see ourselves as too tempted to main-
tain the status quo and, thus, in a rational moment by Constitutional 
amendment, have placed the future-present outside our power to 
control. 
II. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM 
We pride ourselves as a maturing society, searching for human 
dignity; embracing evolving standards of decency; discovering, de-
vising, expanding and sometimes even discarding rights. We feel 
challenged at once to grow and evolve, yet also continue at the core 
on a course we set long ago. Again, Odysseus at the Mast is the 
operative metaphor for this great dynamic tension. We can see in 
our system of government by our basic laws - i.e., the rights we 
take for granted, the method by which we amend those rights, and 
the rights we cannot amend, attempts to act freely in the present 
while being bound by the past. 
A. Laws and Rights 
A law - an authoritative rule which decides a case by criteria 
specified in advance - is itself an instance that shows an advanced 
commitment to sacrifice present inclination to a fixed and settled 
policy from the recent past. Representatives codify the majority's 
will, which articulates "good" public policy - good primarily be-
cause the majority desires it. 
In the Odyssey, however, above and beyond ordinary law -
Odysseus' present commands - there emerged a higher law: ig-
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nore my command and keep on rowing. The need for higher law 
to restrain passions destructive of the common good, as Madison 
explained so brilliantly and clearly in the Federalist Papers, 15 comes 
from the tyrannical threat posed by the most dangerous faction of 
all - the majority. 
Today, the vast majority of Americans may be in favor of 
rounding up all suspected terrorists and their supporters, holding 
them without warrants, torturing them for their information, and 
quietly killing those who would attack us. Perhaps a majority would 
support doing the same to those who rape and kill our children. 
The majority may also favor silencing the unpatriotic who, in times 
of great national tragedy, cheer the success of the enemy. 
But rights are trumps, as Ronald Dworkin declares. 16 A defen-
dant's constitutional right to a jury trial, or free speech, trumps the 
People's emotion of the moment. Rights are real, only if key actors 
in the system rationally commit themselves in advance to restrain 
passions of the moment, including their own. 
Thus, for example, post-Saddam Iraq struggles to enact a con-
stitutional republic, which can at once reflect majority status of the 
Shiites, while at the same time preserving the autonomy of the Sun-
nis and Kurds. Advocates of republican government search for a 
framework that will make a working reality of republicanism's es-
sential credo: majority rule that respects minority rights. 
But how can we guarantee that once the balance is struck, it 
will continue unchanged and yet adaptable to circumstances differ-
ent from what gave it birth? What do we do with rights that no 
longer feel right, with restraints that no longer liberate? 
B. The Amendment Process 
Consider the amendment process itself: a process by which we 
revoke what we have initially guaranteed. But again the metaphor 
applies: we consciously make it cumbersome. In order to alter the 
Constitution, two-thirds of each branch of Congress must initiate 
the amendment and a majority of three-fourths of state legislatures 
must ratify it. Why can we not more easily translate our evolving 
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
16. See RONALD DWORIUN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977) ("Individual rights 
are political trumps when held by individuals."). 
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standards of decency, our growing wisdom, into Constitutional pro-
tection? Because we know ourselves. We know we will mistake mo-
mentary passion for permanent wisdom and insight. So we restrain 
our ability to change our collective mind. 
But change, while cumbersome, is still possible. Some may see 
this as a modification, if not an outright rejection, of the mast meta-
phor.17 I think it partakes of its spirit. Many years ago at the U.S. 
Naval Academy during a post-performance discussion of my anti-
federalist monologue "Vote NO!'', a faculty member suggested a dif-
ferent metaphor which better captures this sense of retardation 
short of absolute binding restraint: the Constitution, he said, is like 
a sea anchor. A sea anchor, as he explained, does not keep a boat 
absolutely fixed to a spot. Rather, during stormy weather, we inten-
tionally drag it behind to stabilize us in rough waters. A sea anchor 
simply slows us down while keeping us more steadily, although 
more slowly, on course. 
The Founders did attempt, however, to put one provision of 
the Constitution out of our own power forever to alter, much as 
Odysseus had attempted with the Sirens. Immediately following the 
amendment procedures, Article V itself concludes: "Provided ... 
that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal 
Suffrage in the Senate."18 
Even this arguably fails as a pristine example: Odysseus sought 
to protect against any change in command even by unanimous con-
sent, his own included. Whereas in the United States, it is conceiva-
ble that a momentary democratic fervor might move all fifty state 
legislatures - including the relatively unpopulated states - to sur-
render their own disproportionate influence and abolish equal rep-
resentation in the Senate. 
Furthermore, the deviously clever could object that Article V is 
itself, like any other clause of the Constitution, potentially subject 
to amendment. A determined supermajority short of unanimity 
17. Cf ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND 92-94 (2000). Issacharoff also suggests, "Ulysses 
bound himself in such a way as to make it impossible for him to yield to the Sirens' 
song. By contrast, most constitutional constraints, such as the supermajority require-
ments of Article V, are designed to retard rather than prohibit the exercise of the popu-
lar will - the overeater who locks his refrigerator does not necessarily throw away the 
key." See Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 1992. 
18. U.S. CoNsT. art. V. 
2004] IF I IMPLORE YOU 569 
could first amend Article V by removing the unanimity required to 
alter one-state one-vote, and then make the Senate proportionately 
representative. 19 
C. Unalienable Rights 
Are there no limits to a determined supermajority's capacity to 
subvert substantive constitutional guarantees while at the same time 
strictly adhering to constitutional procedures? Is there no concept 
by which we can forever place it out of our power to violate human 
dignity even by constitutional formulae? Can rights be enshrined 
and protected even against a supermajority carried away by passion-
ate desire to revoke them? Not strictly within a Constitutional 
framework, especially when the claim to continuity is stripped of 
moral obligation and invested solely by deep procedural necessity. 20 
We are bound by the Original Understanding, the claim goes, only 
because we need to be bound by something and, although arbitrary 
at the beginning, time and success eventually convey legitimacy. 
It's a little like driving on the right side of the road and stopping at 
red lights. "Tradition," a philosopher once declared, "is the forget-
ting of Origins." Understood this way,21 truly irreversible limits are 
impossible and unreal. 
19. In 1992, when Quebec looked like it was about to secede, political leaders in a 
"do-or-die" effort to preserve Canada's unity, offered constitutional changes including a 
House and Senate with a guarantee to Quebec that however its population may decline, 
"its overall parliamentary representation - Senate and House would NEVER drop below 
25 percent." See Clyde H. Farnsworth, Lawmakers Provide Plans on Constitutional Change 
in Keep Canada United, N.Y. TIMES, August 23, 1992, at 14 (emphasis added). The pre-
sent struggle over a provisional and now permanent Constitution for Iraq might well 
result in a similar provision and problem. Cf ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND 101-105 (2000) 
(discussing amendment procedures). 
20. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Learning and Science, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 
138, 139 (1920) ("The law ... is indeed ... the government of the living by the dead. 
To a very considerable extent no doubt it is inevitable that the living should be so 
governed. The past gives us our vocabulary and fixes the limits of our imagination; we 
cannot get away from it. There is, too, a peculiar logical pleasure in making manifest 
the continuity between what we are doing and what has been done before. But the 
present has a right to govern itself so far as it can; and it ought always to be 
remembered that historic continuity with the past is not a duty, it is only a necessity."). 
21. Issacharoff mostly denies moral legitimacy of the Founding generation, and 
rests binding obligation of constitutional limits on a common recognition by those out 
of power - today's losers but potentially tomorrow's winners - that their turn in the 
future can be assured only if they respect present arrangements. It doesn't matter how 
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The American Revolution, however, supplies moral legitimacy 
to the Founding Generation above and beyond the happenstance 
that it designed and ratified the U.S. Constitution. The Declaration 
of Independence - our most sacred secular article of faith - is a 
prime instance of Odysseus at the Mast: "We hold these truths to 
be self-evident" - beyond disproof, beyond dispute - "that all 
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable Rights .... "22 Unalienable rights - life, lib-
erty, and the pursuit of happiness - are by definition rights that 
cannot be denied. By the Declaration of Independence, we funda-
mentally place it outside our own power, for example, to sell our-
selves into slavery.23 
Ironically then, those of us who, like Odysseus, allow the past 
to bind the future when it becomes the present, must disagree with 
Jefferson, the Declaration's principal author, who elsewhere de-
clared the earth belongs entirely to the living, to each generation 
"during its course, fully, and in their own right."24 Thus, "no soci-
ety can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law."25 
For Jefferson, then, "the dead have neither powers nor rights over 
it."26 Constitutionalists instead would side with Madison who coun-
tered his dear friend and insisted that, "the improvements made by 
the dead form a charge against the living who take the benefit of 
them. This charge can no otherwise be satisfied than by executing 
the will of the dead."27 Perhaps Edmund Burke best characterized 
"the great primeval contract of eternal society" as "a partnership 
we do it, as long as we do it by accepted - if arbitrary - rules. For the ancient Greeks, 
long accepted conventions - nomos in physis - acquired a near natural status. An 
Originalist, however, seeks legitimacy beneath the accident of the Founders being the 
initial designer. 
22. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
23. See EI.STER, ULYSSES UNBOUND 102 (2000) ("Some constitutions offer absolute 
entrenchment of rights. Art. 79(3) of the German constitution says that the basic rights 
are immune to revision. Similarly, Article 57 of the Bulgarian constitution says that 
fundamental rights are irrevocable."). In a footnote, however, Elster suggests that Arti-
cle 158 in the Bulgarian constitution implies that Article 57 is itself amendable. 
24. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), available at 
http:/ /wwwJuntosociety.com/i_documents/tjjm.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2004). 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), available at 
http:/ /wwwJuntosociety.com/i_documents/~m_tj.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2004). 
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not only between those who are living, but between those who are 
living, those who are dead, and those who are about to be born."28 
Originalists who feel bound by the dead hand of the Founders 
confront the great paradox that only because the Founding Gener-
ation fashioned, fought, and won the American Revolution - fun-
damentally changing government - did they acquire the moral 
legitimacy essentially to bind us to continue their understanding 
and forever, even by revolution, place it out of our own power to 
reject human dignity - life, liberty, equality, and individual 
happiness. 
III. PROBLEMS AND PARADOXES OF THE MAsT 
In its dynamic application to real ·life situations, the metaphor 
seems increasingly problematic and paradoxical if not downright 
self-contradictory. 
A. Life Without Parole 
In his Second Treatise on Civil Government, John Locke de-
fined "political power" as "a right of making laws with Penalties of 
Death, and consequently all lesser Penalties."29 
Of course in designing and inflicting punishment, the People 
and their representatives must restrain their own passions. An espe-
cially brutal crime might stoke our passion, and our urge to punish 
might be misdirected at the innocent or fail to take into account 
mitigating circumstances. Thus, we have forced restraint upon our-
selves by requiring due process, circumscribing trials through jury 
selection that excludes those who cannot be dispassionate or com-
passionate. We also adopt and apply rules that exclude evidence if 
its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value, and we require a 
jury to find guilt only when they are convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt. And even then, we provide for appeals. 
These devices and others essentially cabin our urge to act im-
mediately by restraining passion long enough to investigate and de-
liberate. To be reliably and fairly administered, the death penalty 
28. EDMUND BuRKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 110 (Dolphin ed. 
1961) (1790). 
29. JOHN E. LocKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1690). Our foun-
ders embraced this essay as the philosophical justification for America's revolution. 
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must operate as a deliberate product of a deliberative process. All 
this is well established, but obscured perhaps is the committment 
underlying life without parole - the penultimate punishment that 
most death penalty opponents view as the only moral alternative. 
By this ultimate exercise of Sovereign power short of death it-
self, We, the living, presently so attuned to this vicious killer's evil 
that we feel certain - now and for always - that however much he 
may grow or be transformed as a human being, he must be con-
fined for life. Regardless of whether the convict is now fully reha-
bilitated, we irrevocably pledge and bind ourselves: This convicted 
killer shall never be set free. 
In meting out Life Without Parole ("LWOP"), we guard against 
the future passion not of rage and disgust that presently move us, 
but against the rationally anticipated decay of anger and the sense 
of forgiveness or mercy that will replace it someday when we would 
focus exclusively on the living criminal and forget the victim of the 
past. How can it serve human dignity to continue to cage a 
changed, non-threatening, harmless person, who seems genuinely 
to regret his mistakes? 
But we have made a covenant with that past - that we shall not 
forget nor forgive; neither review nor revise - a covenant which we 
bind ourselves to keep. Thus we reject the problematic question, 
"What good will it do?" and instead continue to focus on the bad 
that has been done. 
Perhaps LWOP, then, is not so much the Odysseus-like past 
reason protecting against present passion, as a punishment that de-
pends on present passion protecting against future passion;30 or 
perhaps it is present, engaged, and informed emotion protecting 
against a future, detached rationality - rejecting forever the cost-
30. See ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND 19 (2000) ("Sometimes, people precommit 
themselves in a moment of passion to prevent themselves from yielding to another pas-
sion at a later time."). Although he does not apply the metaphor to our collective 
choice of life without parole, ultimately confining it to individuals, Elster does cite Ra-
cine's Andromaque where a rejected lover calls for the immediate death of her ex-
paramour. "While he still Jives, fear lest I pardon him. Suspect my wavering anger till 
his death. Tomorrow I may love him if today he dies not." Id. at 20 (emphasis added). 
"We may use a precommitment device to prevent a change in preferences, or at least to 
disable ourselves from acting on changed preferences." Id. at 57. Elster comes close to 
the insight that life without parole provides, suggesting an addict's strategy of "throwing 
away the key" to disable himself. Id. at 64. 
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benefit analysis that asks, "what good can it do to continue this pun-
ishment?"31 I have visited with these murderers, sometimes decades 
after their dastardly deeds, and too often, hearing their gentle sighs 
and genuine regrets, I too cannot help but wonder "what is the 
point of punishing these lifers until death?" Thus, while we have 
bound ourselves to continue to punish until death, we cannot help 
but wonder sometimes why? 
Whatever it is, LWOP is ultimately Odysseus-like because it cre-
ates a binding commitment at this moment not to think differently 
or feel different when the future becomes the present and the pre-
sent is the past.32 
B. The Boundary Problem 
These fairly brief comments only begin to scratch the surface 
and hardly exhaust the potential reach and power of the metaphor 
to illuminate diverse realms, such as the necessity for, and limits to, 
openness in government: recall, the wise Odysseus shared with his 
men, the perils that faced them. He told his men the truth - al-
most. The metaphor also introduces a distinction between the Sov-
ereign in his or her private and public capacity. Privately, Odysseus 
is a weak man subject to and driven by passion, but in his public 
capacity, he is a wise man governed and restrained by reason. A 
growing literature must reveal other dimensions to this metaphor. 
In closing, however, let's return to the action, with Odysseus 
bound to the mast, desperately struggling to annul his earlier com-
mand: "From the bottom of my heart I longed to listen, and I or-
dered the men to set me free."33 I tried to say untie me to the crew, 
"nodding my head and working my brows, but they went on pulling 
... the oars ... and put more ropes round me and fastened me 
tighter."34 
31. See ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND 24 (2000) (briefly extending the standard meta-
phor of reason constraining passion to "cases of a passionate agent precommitting him-
self against dispassionateness" and also to the "case of a rational agent pre-committing 
himself against [future contrary) rationality"). 
32. Of course even here we back off from absolutely binding commitments al-
though death penalty abolitionists rarely acknowledge it. The governor - the Execu-
tive - may pardon or commute a life without parole sentence to make parole available. 
33. HOMER, su-pra note 1, at 141-42. 
34. Id. at 142. 
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So far so good: Reason has triumphed. Notice, however, that 
the ending is flawed in a way which Homer failed to consider and 
continues to challenge us today: "But when we had gone a long way 
past the Sirens, so that we could hear them no longer, my companions 
took out the wax from their ears and untied my ropes."35 
We could no longer hear them? His men never heard the Si-
rens at all. Consider that moment when Odysseus alone could still 
hear, but only faintly, their alluring call. Presumably the Sirens' 
destructive power diminishes with the square of the hearer's dis-
tance from them. A clever Odysseus, no longer so out of control as 
to evidence his madness, but still under their spell, could scheme 
his way to the Sirens by going limp at the mast. His men would 
then take the wax out of their ears, mistakenly relying on his assur-
ance - his apparent return to rationality - that the danger had 
passed. Then, together having heard the Sirens faintly, they would 
vainly seek to reach them, and all would die in the attempt. 
Wisdom of the ages informs us that no person should judge his 
own case. Yet who else could police that evanescent boundary be-
tween ordinary times and emergency situations? 
Self-reference remains a deep, paradoxical, constitutional flaw. 
In considering a controversy between the Executive & the Legisla-
tive, the Court decides its own jurisdiction: the Court must not take 
jurisdiction where it has none, but it alone decides whether it may 
decide. The national government in a federal republic must police 
the boundary between its own and local power. The President may, 
but must not, pardon himself. The House must impeach its own 
and the Senate remove its own offending member. "This statement 
is false" - is true only if it's false and false only if it's true. Constitu-
tional self-reference is part, perhaps the heart, of the boundary 
problem, which remains as insoluble in politics as it has been in 
mathematics. 
C. Emergencies and Prerogative 
At its core, Odysseus at the Mast stands for the pragmatic ne-
cessity to suspend the ordinary rule and substitute emergency mea-
35. HOMER, supra note 1, at 142 (emphasis added). 
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sures.36 And when the emergency has passed, again to resume the 
ordinary course. But how do we know when the emergency is over? 
Odysseus was forced to judge when the danger had passed and his 
own rationality had returned.37 Very troubling, but then, who else 
could have been relied upon to make that decision? 
Extraordinary times call for extraordinary measures -
sometimes. 
Locke himself, the great revolutionary, called for the exercise 
of executive prerogative within a well-working constitutional plan. 
As he defined it, prerogative was the right to go outside the rules in 
an emergency for the good of the whole, later to be confirmed by 
the whole. 38 
Executive prerogative is, and has been a great challenge to re-
publican government. In the Ship's Money Casr!'9 - probably the 
most complete attempt to wrestle with this difficult issue in Anglo-
American jurisprudence - English judges were forced to consider 
whether King Charles I had claimed a continuing, extended threat 
where none in fact existed in order to circumvent legislative control 
over war funding and foreign policy. Centuries later in the U.S., 
the War Powers Resolution controversy between successive Presi-
dents and Congress, and the Iran/Contra affair also challenged us 
to define, apply, and rightfully limit executive prerogative. 
Now, in this post 9/11 world, the Executive response to inter-
national terrorism, including the reach of the USA Patriot Act, the 
use of torture in interrogation, and special tribunals outside the 
confines of ordinary constitutional due process similarly challenge 
us. 
If the Executive exercises prerogative too often, especially by 
pretextually claiming emergency where there is none, and resting 
that claim on secret information, the Constitution as a restraining 
force will be corroded from within. It will be a Constitution in 
36. Again, perhaps the metaphor has been inverted. Odysseus exercised his pre-
rogative by turning over power temporarily to his men, whereas today, in emergency 
situations, the Executive does not relinquish but assumes greater power. 
37. While to the best of my knowledge the literature is silent on this flaw, CJ. 
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 638 (discussing of fear and panic, and addressing 
the problem of whether a once irrational agent can be relied upon to judge that he or 
she has regained rationality). 
38. See LocKE, supra note 29. 
39. 3 How. St. Tr. 825 (1637). 
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name only.40 On the other hand, if the Executive ignores vital ne-
cessity and fails to exercise prerogative, the entire constitutional re-
public may be suddenly and irrevocably destroyed from without. 
We want the truth, but can we handle it? We want to hear the 
Sirens but should we? Has the emergency passed? Is it time to take 
the wax out of our ears, to unbind Congress, and reassess? Can we 
afford to? Can we afford not to? 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The story of Odysseus at the Mast ~eaches us that the earth 
does not belong entirely to the living. It is, as Burke declared, a 
covenant between the living, the dead, and the not yet born. Thus, 
the metaphor stands profoundly for making and keeping covenants 
with the dead: in constitutional interpretation, the sea anchor of 
Original Intent; in the ultimate exercise of domestic sovereign 
power, punishment with retribution as its primary justification.41 
Ultimately, the metaphor suggests that unless we allow the past 
to bind us, the future may never become the present. 
Or at least not one in which we would choose to live. 
40. Sometimes the Executive itself, in Odysseus-like fashion, takes the lead in re-
stricting its own prerogative. Elizabeth I, for example, who by later consensus, had used 
executive prerogative rightly in combating the Spanish Armada, also inserted a "con-
tinuall charge to her justices ... not therefore cease to doe right in any point" even if it 
meant ignoring her specific commands under seal. FAITH THOMPSON, MAGNA CARTA: 
ITs ROLE IN THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 1300-1629 244 (1948). Elster 
cites Spinoza's example of the Persians who worshipped their kings as gods, yet felt 
bound by the fundamental laws of the kingdom "as the king's permanent decrees, so 
that his ministers render him complete obedience in refusing to execute any command 
of his which contravenes them." Spinoza himself cited Ulysses "whose comrades did 
execute his command in refusing, in spite of all his orders and threats, to untie him." 
See ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND 88 (2000). After the Phillipines terminated the Marcos 
dictatorship, President Corazon Aquino, possessed of nearly unlimited power, ap-
pointed a Commission to draw up a Constitution and declared, "Nobody, not even I 
your President, can overrule you." See Seth Mydans, Aquino Asks Penal to 'Be Quick' in 
Preparing a New Constitution, N .Y. TIMES, June 3, 1986, at D26. 
41. Although the literature is silent, Originalism and Retributivism are deeply con-
nected - psychologically, if not philosophically. 
